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Abstract
If the public and private firm have mixed motives about payoff in a simultaneous-move
game, Choi (2006) analyzes that the resulting equilibrium turns out to be an inefficient level
with the monopoly of private firm even if there are Nash equilibria. However, we find that if
we use equilibrium profit, we would have solved its unique Nash equilibrium that both firms
aim to maximize the relative payoffs.
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Although some theoretical works have already succeeded in explaining a mixed oligopoly, Choi
(2006) investigates the simultaneous-move games in a mixed duopoly where a public ﬁrm and
a private ﬁrm are maximizers of either proﬁts or relative proﬁts. Contrary to previous re-
sults (De Fraja and Delbono; 1989, 1990), if each ﬁrm has mixed motives about payoﬀ in a
simultaneous-move game, Choi (2006) analyzes that each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ motives is mixed, the
resulting equilibrium turns out to be an ineﬃcient level with the monopoly of private ﬁrm even
if the public ﬁrm participates in the productive activity. The existence of the pubic ﬁrm never
aﬀects the equilibrium output in the simultaneous-move games discussed in mixed motives.
The result of endogenous simultaneous move in a mixed duopoly is a new one since so far the
literature the absolute payoﬀs in a mixed oligopoly have found various robust results. In this
sense, Choi (2006) makes a contribution to the literature. However, we show that comparing
each ﬁrm’s equilibrium levels of output and proﬁts as deﬁned Choi (2006) is only meaningful
when his equilibrium levels of outputs is correct. We ﬁnd that if we use equilibrium proﬁt, we
would have solved its unique Nash equilibrium that both ﬁrms aim to maximize the relative
payoﬀs.
2 The Model
Consider that a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm, all producing a single homogenous product in a
mixed duopoly model. Following Choi (2006), we use a linear inverse demand schedule for the
industry p = 1 − Q : Q = q0 + q1 where p is a price for two ﬁrms (i = 0,1), q0 and q1 denote
the output of public ﬁrm and private ﬁrm, respectively. Assume that total cost to ﬁrm i of
producing quantity qi is C(qi) = cqi. Assume that 1 > c > 0, so that there is some value for
total output Q for which market price is greater than the ﬁrms’ common marginal cost c.
The absolute payoﬀ of each ﬁrm i is given by πa
i = pqi − cqi and the relative payoﬀ of the
ﬁrm i is deﬁned in the evolutionary game theory (Samuelson(1997, pp. 66), Weibull (1995, pp.
71-74) and Vega-Redondo (1997)) as the diﬀerence between i’s absolute payoﬀ and the average
absolute payoﬀ of all ﬁrms. The average absolute payoﬀ is given by (1/2)(πa
i +πa
j),j 6= i in our











(qi − qj)(p − c). (1)
To distinguish notations, the superscripts of lm are deﬁned as when the private ﬁrm acting
the l-payoﬀ-maximizer and when the public ﬁrm acting as the m-payoﬀ-maximizer where l,m =
a,r. For simplicity, following Samuelson (1997, pp. 66) and Weibull(1995, pp. 71-74), we specify






0 where l = a,r;m = a,r, (2)
where Q2/2 is consumer surplus and each πlm
i ,i = 0,1 is ﬁrm i’s proﬁts of both private and
public ﬁrm.
3 New Equilibrium Outputs and Payoﬀs
To distinguish notations, each output is deﬁned as qlm
i when the public ﬁrm aims to maximize
l = a,r payoﬀ and the private ﬁrm aims to maximize m = a,r payoﬀ.
1First, consider simultaneous-move games in a mixed duopoly when both ﬁrms aim to maxi-
mize the absolute payoﬀ. However, in Choi(2006), page 3, the equilibrium outputs of simultaneous-
move games are given by q∗
0 = (1 − c)/2 and q∗
1 = (1 − c)/4. However, his calculation is not
correct. That is, the public ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize welfare deﬁned as the sum of con-
sumer surplus and absolute proﬁts of all ﬁrms, and the private ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize








1 , and max
q1
πaa
1 = pq1 − cq1.
Straightforward computation yields each ﬁrm’s reaction functions: q0 = 1 − c − q1,q1 =
1−c−q0
2 .
Thus, the correct results should be qaa
1 = 0 and qaa
0 = 1 − c. Each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is then
Waa =
(1−c)2
2 ,πaa = 0.
Next, consider that the maximization problems for the relative-payoﬀ-maximizer of public
ﬁrm and private ﬁrm. Indeed, Choi (2006) computed that the public ﬁrm of relative-payoﬀ-
maximizer maximizes ﬁrst equation (i.e., ∂Wrr
∂q0 < 0 ⇔ q0 = −q1) on page 4 when the private
ﬁrm aims to maximize relative payoﬀ. Given the public ﬁrm of the relative-payoﬀ-maximizer,
the private ﬁrm’s objective function is given by maxq1 πrr
1 = 1
2(qi − qj)(p − c) which yields q1 =
1−c
2 . Furthermore, when we calculate the maximization of Wrr, the relative-payoﬀ-maximizer
of public ﬁrm’s maximization problem is given by maxq0 Wrr = 1
2(q0+q1)2 = consumer surplus.
When the public ﬁrm maximizes consumer surplus, it has to take into account the condition
that consumer surplus is maximized when Q = q1 + q0 = 1. Thus, the best response of the










Each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is then Wrr = 1
2,πrr = c2
2 .
Finally, other calculations of mixed motives of payoﬀ in mixed duopoly are given by Choi
(2006), page 4. However, his calculations are not correct. In these cases, the War = Wra =
1
2(q0 +q1)(1−c) is obtained. Since each derivative of the public ﬁrm’s payoﬀ with respect to q0
is ∂Wra/∂q0 = ∂War/∂q0 =
(1−c)
2 > 0, we have similar response functions as in the Wrr case.
That is, the relative (respectively, absolute)-payoﬀ maximizing private ﬁrm’s reaction function
is q1 = 1−c
2 (respectively, q1 =
1−c−q0




0 = 1 − c,qar
1 = qra
1 = 0
because the public ﬁrm has to take into account the condition that the consumer surplus is
maximized when Q = 1. Each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is then War = Wra = 1−c
2 ,πar
1 = 0 and πra
1 = c2
2 . As
a result, Choi’s (2006) main result might be changed by using pure Nash equilibrium deﬁntion1.
3.1 Simultaneous-Move Games with Mixed Motives
Choi (2006) summarized each equilibrium output from mixed motives where diﬀerent ﬁrms
coexist that value the relative payoﬀ and absolute payoﬀ, respectively. He analyzes that each
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ motives is mixed, the resulting equilibrium turns out to be an ineﬃcient level with
the monopoly of private ﬁrm even if the public ﬁrm participates in the productive activity.
Instead, we discuss four simultaneous-move games with equilibrium payoﬀs and investigate the
unique Nash equilibrium of the extended quantity setting mixed duopoly game.
1I am grateful to Noriaki Matsushima for drawing my attention to the issue of optimal solutions.
2Thus, we have some doubts on the result: (i) how can quantities be used as payoﬀs to solve a
game in Choi (2006)? we need to justify this, (ii) our work do not deal with the application of the
evolutionary game theory; rather, it might assume that the proﬁt motives of public and private
ﬁrms participating in mixed duopoly could be predicted. Accordingly, choosing the production
quantity endogenously should be taken to mean strategically choosing the proﬁt motive as an
independent variable.
In the table, “ai,i = 0,1” and “ri,i = 0,1” represent absolute-payoﬀ-maximizer and relative-
payoﬀ-maximizer with regard to payoﬀ motive choice respectively. Straightforward calculation
yields the payoﬀ table below.















As shown in Table 1, we can solve its Nash equilibrium that satisﬁes uniqueness: the Nash
equilibrium outcome in Table 1 is (r1,r0). From this result, the proposition is derived as follows.
Proposition 1: Suppose that there is a mixed duopoly with mixed motives. Then there is a
unique pure Nash equilibrium outcome: both ﬁrms always act as the relative-payoﬀ-maximizers.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate the simultaneous-move game in a mixed duopoly where ﬁrms are
maximizers of either proﬁts or relative proﬁts. Thus, we ﬁnd that if we use equilibrium proﬁt,
we solved its unique Nash equilibrium that both ﬁrms aim to maximize the relative payoﬀs. As
a next step, investigating the sequential-move game in the mixed oligopoly is needed for future
research2.
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